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MANDAMUS TO REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
IN WEST VIRGINIA*
RAY JAY DAvis**

I:nTAT0N by law of governmental action and legal responsibility

ofofficials are ramparts in defense of constitutional democracy.
The American people expect all branches of government-executive
and legislative, as well as judicial-to protect us against arbitrary
official action.' Lawyers, however, are primarily interested in judicial restraints and limitations upon officialdom. This article is an
examination of the West Virginia law concerning one of the methods
used by courts to control administrative officers-the writ of
mandamus.
This common law writ is an order from a court, directed to an
executive official or to an inferior tribunal, commanding or prohibiting an act, the completion or omission of which is required by
law.2 In West Virginia, by virtue of constitutional3 and statutory
provisions, 4 the circuit courts are vested with power to issue man* A companion article concerning mandamus to review administrative
action in Arkansas is being concurrently published in the fall 1957 issue of the
Arkansas Law Review.
00 Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
IFor a discussion of executive controls over administrative action, see
LAw 159-69 (1954). Legislative conGELLHoRN AN BYSE, ADmNISTmATn
trols are usually discussed in the context of delegation of powers. DAvis,

AnhxsmrsTRn& LAW §§ 10-27 (1951).

For a discussion of other legislative

controls, see GELLHORN AND BysE, Anmi

mTRATIVE LAW 149-59.

2 2 SPELLING, INJuNcnONS AND OTHER ExTnsoRamiNAy REmS
(1901); MERRILL, M
uAm's
§ 1 (1892).

§

1363

The constitutional and statutory grants of mandamus jurisdiction to West
Virginia courts contain no definition of mandamus; neither do they say when or

in what cases mandamus will be issued. That is governed by common law.
Douglas v. Loomis, 5 W. Va. 542 (1871).
a W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
4 W. VA. CODE c. 53, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1955).
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damus. By constitutional grant the Supreme Court of Appeals not
only can review circuit court mandamus proceedings, but also has
original jurisdiction to award the writ.5
In the past few years mandamus has become ever more popular
as a judicial device for securing individual rights through curbing
unreasonable action by state and local bureaucracy. Indeed recently the supreme court has several times noted that:
"The tendency in this jurisdiction is to enlarge and advance
the scope of the remedy of mandamus, rather than to restrict and limit it, in order to afford the relief to which a
party is entitled when there is no other adequate and complete legal remedy.""
The purpose of this article is to examine some of the methods
whereby the West Virginia courts have broadened the scope of
this writ, to explore some of the reasons for widening it, and to
note the formulas by which issuance of mandamus is governed
today.
Prior to the late nineteenth century administrative activity
consisted primarily of summary action by health, licensing, and tax
officials. Although under the Constitution of West Virginia judicial
review from administrative determinations must be available,7 until
the modern age of social and economic legislation it was considered unnecessary to provide specifically for control by the courts
of administrative action. Common law judicial writs, including
mandamus, were employed to control these activities.8 Equitable
remedies were also available to prevent irreparable injuries by officials.9 But these remedies have been fraught with technical limitaCONST. art. VIII, § 3.
Exercise of the original jurisdiction of the supreme court when it is invoked
is an "inescapable duty" imposed upon it. Midland Investment Corp. v. Ballard,
101 W. Va. 591, 594, 133 S.E. 316, 317 (1926). It cannot be evaded by rule
of court. Cf. Ex parte Doyle, 62 W. Va. 280, 57 S.E. 824 (1907) (habeas
corpus case in which the reasoning used would apply to mandamus).
6 State ex rel. Vance v. Arthur, 98 S.E.2d 418, (W. Va. 1957). See also
Stowers v. Blackburn, 90 S.E.2d 277, 283 (W. Va. 1955); Carter v. Bluefield,
132 W. Va. 881, 897, 54 S.E.2d 749, 757 (1949).
This broad view of mandamus is in line with the views of Lord Mansfield
expressed in Rex v. Barker, 8 Bur. 1265 (1762).
7Wilson v. Hix, 136 W. Va. 59, 65 S.E.2d 717 (1951); De Constantin
v. Public Service Comm'n, 75 W. Va. 32, 83 S.E. 88 (1914). But cf. W. VA.
CODE c. 8, art. 6 § 8 (Michie 1955).
s J.A. E, Aiurrways LAw 492 (1953).
9 Officials themselves are often empowered to seek injunctive assistance
as an aid in enforcement of the laws they administer. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE

5 W. VA.
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tions and uncertainties. Therefore, many statutes establishing administrative agencies now provide specific methods of judicial
review. For example, statutory procedures have been set up for
review of decisions of workmen's compensation 0 and unemployment security officials" and of the insurance commissioner.' 2 Where
statutes so provide the older remedies are generally unavailable;
the procedure set forth by the legislature must be followed.' 3
Instead of fashioning judicial remedies tailored to the subject
matter the legislature has from time to time stipulated that mandamus shall be the statutory means of review. Findings of the
racing commission are subject to review by mandamus,' 4 county
courts may be mandamused to compel levy of taxes to satisfy unpaid judgments against the county, 15 and the writ may be awarded
to require election officials to perform certain duties.'( Also on at
least one occasion the supreme court has interpreted a review
statute as providing for mandamus.' 7 By statute, under certain circ. 16, art. 14, § 14 (Michie 1955); id. c. 30, art. 4, § 18; id. c. 80, art. 5,
§ 28; id. c. 8, art. 16, § 1; id. c. 24, art. 2, § 2. In such enforcement proceedings the defendants will assert that the administrative action was illegal.
Thus, the proceeding, in effect, will become a review of the administrative
determination.
10 W. VA. CODE c. 23, art 5, § 4 (Michie 1955).
11 Id. c. 21A, art. 7, § 22.
12W. VA. CODE c. 83, art. 2, § 11 (Michie Supp. 1957).
13 Howle v. Alabama State Milk Control Board, 265 Ala. 189, 90 So. 2d
752 (1956).
Sometimes of course there is a gap in the scheme for statutory review.
In some instances of that sort common law writs are available for purposes of
seeldng review. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, 186 W. Va. 80, 65
S.E.2d 649 (1951); Green v. Board of Education, 133 W. Va. 356, 56 S.E.2d
100 (1949); State ex rel. Board of Education v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163
S.E. 850 (1932).
14W. VA. CODE c. 19, art. 23, § 6 (Michie Supp. 1957). An earlier
version of this statute was applied in Tweel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n,
138 W. Va. 531, 76 S.E.2d 874 (1953).
15 W. VA. CODE c. 7, art. 5, § 9 (Michie 1955).
By virtue of this statute mandamus is the only available remedy here.
Ratliff v. County Court, 83 W. Va. 94, 10 S.E. 28 (1889); but see Taylor
County Court v. Holt, 53 W. Va. 582, 44 S.E. 887 (1903).
16W. VA. CODE c. 3, art 5, § 41 (Michie 1955). This statute gives
the writ of mandamus more scope than at common law, rendering it a process
to control election officers in all actions, ministerial or judicial. State ex rel.
Bumgardner v. Mills, 182 W. Va. 580, 588, 53 S.E.2,d 416, 424 (1949);
Sanders v. Board of Canvassers, 79 W. Va. 303, 90 S.E. 865 (1916). Mandamus
will not issue here, however, unless the petitioner can show he has a clear
legal right to the remedy sought. Adams v. Londeree, 139 W. Va. 748, 83
S.E.2d 127 (1954).
17 Lively v. State Compensation Comm'r, 118 W. Va. 242, 167 S.E. 588
(1983), construing W. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 5, § I (Michie 1931).
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cumstances, mandamus is available to officials as a mode of enforcing the law. For example, the public service commission in
8
proper cases can use it to compel obedience to lawful rate orders,'
and it will issue upon application by certain officials to require
public utilities to exercise their license or franchise. 19
In spite of these modem modes of review, however, many
administrative boards and officers are still not covered specifically
by review statutes. In West Virginia this is especially true in the
areas of licensing, government employment, and disbursement of
20
revenues. There the common law remedies still predominate.
The most serviceable of the common law remedies are the
writs of certiorari and mandamus. Certiorari "is more or less the
progenitor of the modem statutory review." 2' At its name implies,
this writ commands an inferior tribunal to certify its record to the
court for review. According to the formula generally used by the
courts in determining whether certiorari will issue, that writ can
be directed only to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which make
determinations on a record. 22 Because of this limitation counsel
seeking review of administrative determinations cannot often resort
to certiorari. Thus, in many cases, lawyers must turn to mandamus.
Prior to the latter-day enlargement of mandamus in West Virginia the relator, or petitioner for the writ, faced two principal
obstacles to success: (1) he had to show that there was no available adequate judicial remedy; and (2) the courts would issue the
'SW. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 2, § 2 (Michie 1955). This statute was applied
recently in State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Southern West Virginia
Oil & Gas Corp., 91 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1956).
19 W. VA. CODE c. 8, art. 4, § 16 (Michie 1955). For an application of
this statute, see State ex rel. City of Benwood v. Benwood & McMechen Water
Co., 94 W. Va. 724, 120 S.E. 918 (1924).
2OUnder proper conditions equitable remedies, such as declaratory
judgment, W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 12, §§ 1-16 (Michie 1955), are also
available.
21 JAFFE, AmnasmTPrrvE LAw 494.
22
Quesenberry v. State Road Comnm'n, 103 W. Va. 714, 138 S.E. 362
(1927).
For other applications of the law of certiorari, see State ex rel. Board of
Education v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163 S.E. 850 (1932); Reynolds Taxi
Co. v. Hudson, 103 W. Va. 173, 136 S.E. 833 (1927).
Certiorari is sometimes available instead of mandamus. State ex rel. Baer
v. Becldey, 133 W. Va. 459, 57 S.E.2d 263 (1949) (certiorari as method of
review from agency acting in partly judicial capacity); State ex rel. Ellis v.
State Road Conun'n, 100 W. Va. 531, 131 S.E. 7 (1925) (certiorari, not
mandamus, available when agency acting in discretionary capacity deprives
petitioner of property right.)
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writ only when the action to be compelled was "ministerial" or
involved no element of administrative "discretion." Another form
of the second notion was that a court could command an officer
only if he was under a "clear legal duty." Each of these hurdles
will be discussed in turn to determine the extent to which they
are still applicable.
I.

IN.ADEQUATE BEMEDY

Mandamus is a sort of last ditch remedy. If no other adequate
remedy is available, then, and only then, will it issue. The writ
was developed to protect persons without other recourse against
official unreasonableness. 23 It will not lie if some other method is
available. Therefore, litigants seeking mandamus must first exhaust
all available administrative remedies and then make certain no
judicial redress is provided.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been woven into the fabric of West Virginia law both by statutory
enactment 24 and by case decisions. 25 The courts will refuse to
take jurisdiction over matters which have been delegated to agency
officials until the administrative process is at an end. An interesting comparison can be seen in the case of Drew v. City of Mount
Hope.2 6 Drew's application for transfer of certain licenses to an-

other building into which he was moving was refused by city
authorities. The court, on the one hand, granted mandamus to
compel transfer of the restaurant, soft drink, and tobacco licenses.
But, on the other hand, it refused the writ as to the beer license.

The ordinance involved provided that after refusal of a beer license an applicant was entitled to appear before the city council
and be advised of the reasons for the action. Drew had not taken
this step before he went to court. He had not exhausted his administrative remedies.
23 MEtppjY,

MAWM.Urs § 10.

c. 21A, art. 7, § 19 (Michie 1955).
See, e.g., Drew v. City of Mount Hope, 114 W. Va. 135, 171 S.E. 743
1938); State ex rel. Croy v. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co., 86
W. Va. 260, 103 S.E. 340 (1920).
For recent federal cases involving West Virginia parties in which the
exhaustion doctrine was discussed, see Morgantown Glassware Guild v.
Humphrey, 326 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 896 (1956);
United States v. Jacovelty, 204 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1953); Gates v. Woods,
169 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1948); Sleeth v. Dairy Products Co., 228 F.2d 165,
168 (4th Cir. 1955), 58 W. VA. L. Rxv. 427 (1956) (dictum).
24W. VA. CODE
25

26 114 W. Va. 135, 171 S.E. 743 (1933).
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The reasons for the exhaustion doctrine may be seen by examination of the Croy case. 27 The relator had hired a plumber to
connect his water line into a water company's main. The company, which had a rule requiring plumbers who did such work
to be approved by it, refused to turn on the water because the
petitioner's plumber was not so approved. The public service
commission had been given jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of such rules. But Croy attempted to short-circuit the
administrative process by seeking mandamus from the supreme
court to compel the water company to tun on the water. If the
court had entertained his application, it would have upset efficient
and orderly procedure under the statute giving the commission
power over public utilities; use would not have been made of the
specialized understanding of public utilities regulation that 28the
members and staff of the commission are presumed to possess.
While it is quite clear that courts will close their doors until
completion of administrative proceedings, they have dispensed
with the exhaustion doctrine when no adequate administrative
remedies are available. Where it is impossible or extremely difficult for litigants to obtain administrative final determinations,
courts may not require "exhaustion of administrative litigants." 20
For example, the Supreme Court of the United States, which has
generally adopted a tough attitude concerning exhaustion,"0 did
not apply it in Smith v. Illinois Bell Co., 1 because for two years
the administrative agency had remained "practically dormant,"
2

7State ex rel. Croy v. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co.,
86 W. Va. 260, 103 S.E. 340 (1920).
28

For an expression of the reasons for exhaustion, see DAvis, AmnsmsTATIE LAw §§ 183-87. See also Schwartz, Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction in Federal Administrative Law, 38 GEO. L.J. 868 (1950); Stason, Timing
of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action, 25 MIN. L. REv.
560 (1941); McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative
Orders 28 CAt. L. REv. 129 (1940); Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative
Rmedies,
48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939); Note, 62 Hunv. L. REv. 1216 (1949).
29
This phrase comes from the title of an article on an allied topic.
Schwartz, Primary Administrative jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Litigants,
41 GEo.
L.J. 495 (1953).
80
The leading Supreme Court cases are: Macauley v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946), and Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 (1938). See also Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft, 347 U.S. 535
(1954). In reliance upon the Waterman and Bethlehem cases the Court
reversed lower court determinations in Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 846
U.S. 868 (1953), and Federal Power Commn v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.,

830 U.S. 802 (1947).

81270 U.S. 587 (1926).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss1/2

6

Davis: Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in West Virginia

MANDAMUS AS REVIEW METHOD
and because property "may be as effectively taken by long-continued
and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as
by an express affirmance of them."3 2 Also the judges will not insist

83
that litigants take steps not required by the administrative process

or make useless demands upon officials. 34
Once the litigant has completed the administrative process,
he is not yet in a position to seek mandamus. Under general law
he also has to follow through any available judicial remedies. In
most instances, when he does so, he either will have obtained his
judicial relief or else his cause will have been rejected by the
courts as one without merit. Therefore, generally, if some judicial
remedy is provided, mandamus will be denied.3 5 This position
is perfectly understandable in view of the reasons given for providing the courts with power to issue the writ. It was meant to
take care of situations where a judicial remedy should be available, but is not otherwise provided.3 6
Judicial remedies, like administrative ones, need not be exhausted if they are adequate.3 7 The difficulty is in determining
82 Id. at

591.
See also Addns v. School Board, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246
F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. W=_n 3127 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1957)
(No. 361); PARKE, Aimn Ismraxnv, LAw 121 (1952). But see International
Longshoremens and Warehousemens Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222
(1954); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United Air Lines, 846 U.S. 402 (1953).
33
State ex rel. Huntington v. Heffley, 127 W. Va. 254, 32 S.E.2d 456

(1944).

84 Fisher v. Charleston, 17 W. Va. 595-(1881).
85 For West Virginia cases denying mandamus because a judicial remedy
is available, see, e.g., Doran v. Whyte, 75 W. Va. 368, 83 S.E. 1925 (1914);
Miller v. County Court, 84 W. Va. 285, 12 S.E. 702 (1890).
Declaratory judgment lies "in cases of actual and existing controversies,
such as might be the basis of litigation through the ordinary or extraordinary
processes of law or equity, and not otherwise." Crank v. McLaughlin, 125
W. Va. 126, 23 S.E.2d 56 (1942) (syllabus). Although in 1948 it was held
possible to try title to office by seeking a declaratory decree, Daugherty v.
Town of Mabscott, 131 W. Va. 500, 48 S.E.2d 342 (1948), something for which
mandamus ordinarily was used, the availability of declaratory judgment has
not stopped the supreme court from determining title to office upon a petition
for mandamus. Stowers v. Blackburn, 90 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1955). Remedy
by declaratory judgment apparently will not prevent a person from seeking
mandamus, at least in cases in which, prior to adoption of declaratory judgment,
mandamus
would lie.
36
Mosms, M.AismA.s 17-18 (1866).
37
See, e.g., Stowers v. Blackburn, 90 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1955); Carter
v. Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949); State ex rel. Miller v.
Board of Education, 126 W. Va. 248, 27 S.E.2d 599 (1943); Hardin v. Foglesong, 117 W. Va. 544, 186 S.E. 808 (1936); State ex rel. Simon v. Heatherly,
96 W. Va. 865, 123 S.E. 795 (1924); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Riggs, 75
W. Va. 353, 83 S.E. 1020 (1914).
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whether or not a remedy is "adequate." Is a judicial remedy which
is not so convenient as mandamus inadequate? In West Virginia
it has been held that the remedy of appeal from removal from a
government job is inadequate because it does not provide specifically for restoration to office or payment of salary.38 Probably,
however, reinstatement and payment would have followed successful conclusion of an appeal. Mandamus was merely more convenient. Quo warranto has been held inadequate because it only
determines the right to an office and does not compel appointment of someone entitled to the office.39 Although that would
seem to be a matter which naturally would follow once title to
the office had been determined, it is obvious that mandamus is a
more effective remedy than quo warranto. Is a judicial remedy
inadequate because it is too slow? There have been cases in this
jurisdiction in which the speed of mandamus has led the court to
grant it instead of requiring use of normal appellate procedures
set forth by statute.40 It is submitted that, because of the highly
remedial nature of mandamus (a direct command either to perform or not to perform an act), there are not too many instances
when other means for judicial review of administrative action
would be quite so handy. Therefore, by a loose definition of "adequate," the Supreme Court of Appeals has all but nullified the
"no adequate judicial remedy" requirement and has greatly increased the number of cases in which mandamus will lie.
State ex rel. Vance v. Arthur4' sheds some light on the requirement of inadequacy under current West Virginia law. Vance was
twice improperly convicted of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol. 42 The judgments were certified to
the department of motor vehicles and the commissioner, as required by statute,43 revoked Vance's driver's license for ten years.
When the petitioner discovered the judgments were illegal, he made
unsuccessful demands on the two judges to vacate the judgments
and on the commissioner to reinstate his license. He could then
38 Stowers v. Blackburn, 90 S.E.2d 277 (W.Va. 1955).
39 State ex rel. Miller v. Board of Education, 126 W. Va. 248, 27 S.E.2d
599 (1948).
4
OHardin v. Folgesong, 117 W. Va. 544, 186 S.E. 808 (1936); State
ex rel. Simon v. Heatherly, 96 W. Va. 865, 123 S.E. 795 (1924).
4198
S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1957).
42
The convictions were improper because the proceedings were held
without a warrant as required by statute. W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 18, § 2
(Michie 1955).
43 Id. c. 17B, art. 3, §5.
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have proceeded by taking appeals from the convictions and, upon
successful conclusion of the appeals, by asking the commissioner
to reinstate his license. Instead Vance successfully sought mandamus to compel the commissioner to reinstate the license. The
court noted that:
"The existence of another remedy will not preclude resort to
mandamus for specific relief unless such other remedy is
specific and appropriate to the circumstances of the particular case and requires performance of the duty to be
sought."44
Mandamus was cheaper and faster than taking the appeals and
asking for administrative reinstatement once the appeals succeeded. Besides, the commissioner might not have acted even
45
should the convictions have been reversed.
There will be instances in which a person, at the onset of
his dispute with an agency, might have an available judicial
remedy but loses it later. Where the loss is without fault by the
petitioner, he can claim mandamus as a method of review. 46 But
where the relator is at fault in losing his normal remedy, as, for
example, when he permits the statute of limitations to run, he is
not entitled to mandamus on the ground he has no other remedy.4
The writ is not for those who have slept on their rights.
II.

MnISTEB.AL-DIscaBIONARY

Acr DiCHOTOmY

Previously in mandamus proceedings in West Virginia there
was a central question: Was the official action complained of
"ministerial," or was it "discretionary"? It was asserted that:
"[M]andamus will not lie to control the exercise of the
discretion of any court, board, or officer when the act com44 98 S.E.2d at 425.
45 For other cases in which mandamus might still have been necessary

after pursuing the other available remedies, see Eureka Pipe Line Co. v.
Riggs, 75 W. Va. 353, 83 S.E. 1020 (1914); Thomas v. Town of Mason,
39 W. Va. 526, 20 S.E. 580 (1894).
46E.g., cases in which applicants for permits lose the right to appeal
because in applying they had to act as though the ordinance providing for the
permits was valid and on appeal they could not assume a contrary position.
Carter v. Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949). But of. Paint
Creek Transit Co. v. City of Montgomery, 126 W. Va. 663, 29 S.E.2d 631

(1944).

47State ex -Pel. Scott v. Scearce, 303 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1957).
See also Myers v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 316, 167 S.E.

740 (1933).
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plained of is either judicial or quasi judicial in its nature
.... But .... that if the act to be performed is not one of
legal discretion-that is judicial48in nature-but is merely
ministerial, mandamus will lie."
The character of the act was controlling. If the courts found it
was "ministerial," "mandatory," or "required," they held for the
relator.49 If, however, the respondent could convince them that
the matter was "discretionary," "political," or "judicial" in character,
. 0
he could, with certain exceptions, defeat the issuance of the writ
The difficulty with this rule is obvious. Just what type of actions can be classified "ministerial"? What activities are properly
labelled "discretionary"? Not even the supreme court can always
agree as to the proper classification of an act.51 The fact of the
matter is that there is no clear-cut ministerial-discretionary act
dichotomy. "Discretion is the power to make a choice among competing considerations. All powers to act admit on the one hand
some elements of choice if only as to the manner of detail. On
the other hand, nearly all powers to act, however numerous and
broad the considerations relevant to choice, exclude and deny the
legality of other elements as factors of choice." 52 This difficulty
4
S Marcum v. Ballot Comm'rs, 42 W. Va. 263, 265, 26 S.E. 281 (1895).
But in this particular case the distinction made no difference because by statute
both ministerial and discretionary acts were subject to control by mandamus.
The mandamus formula used by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803), assumes the same distinction.
See also Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn.
55, 21 N.W.2d 203 (1945), discussed in Riesenfeld, Bauman and Maxwell,

judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of ExtraordinaryRemedies
in Minnesota, 33 MINN. L. REv. 569, 593 (1949); 2 SPELLING, Op. cit. supra
note 2, § 1884; IGhoEXTRAomiNARY LEGAL REMEDIEs § 34 (3d ed. 1898);
MEmLL, MANDAMUs §§ 29, 33.
49For current cases so holding, see, e.g., State ex tel. Vance v. Arthur,
98 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1957); Meisel v. O'Brien, 93 S.E.2d 481 (W. Va.
1956); State ex tel. Bullard v. County Court, 92 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1956);
State ex rel. County Court v. West Virginia State Bd. of Health, 137 W. Va.
284, 70 S.E.2d 903 (1952); State ex tel. Board of Aeronautics v. Sims, 129
W. Va. 694, 41 S.E.2d 506 (1947).
50 See, e.g., Meador v. County Court, 87 S.E.2d 725 (W. Va. 1955);
Bates v. Board of Education, 133 W. Va. 225, 55 S.E.2d 777 (1949); Walden
v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 307, 167 S.E. 748 (1933);
Reynolds v. State Road Conm'n, 111 W. Va. 398, 162 S.E. 319 (1932);
State ex tel. Dillon v. Neal, 104 W. Va. 259, 139 S.E. 757 (1927); State ex tel.
Ellis v. State Road Commn, 100 W. Va. 531, 131 S.E. 7 (1925); Wintz v.
Board of Education, 28 W. Va. 227 (1886).
51
See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund
v. Huntington, 96 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1956).
52 j -J, Aimrr~usmtATnvn LAw 499.
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leads to a suspicion that at least sometimes the definition of an
act describes a result, rather than explains how it was achieved.
Assuming administrative acts validly can be classified as either
mandatory or discretionary, it does not follow that once an act is
judicially characterized the grant or denial of mandamus is automatic. The bare formula fails to take account of the variable meaning of "discretion." It may include questions of law, questions of
fact, so-called mixed questions of law and fact, and questions
concerning policy. Courts of course do not regard those questions
in the same way upon review. They are much more likely to substitute their own judgment for that of an administrative official on
matters of law than on matters of fact or policy.5 3 Perhaps when
"discretion" involves a matter of law mandamus might be more
readily forthcoming than when it involves a matter of fact-finding.
At any rate the supreme court in mandamus cases has kept quite
strict control over administrative determinations of law.54
There are of course many cases which fit the old ministerialdiscretionary act formula.5 5 But there are those which do not
seem to follow it. The West Virginia courts have issued the writ
in review of discretionary acts, and in other cases have not awarded
it even though the acts involved were mandatory or ministerial.
A. Writ Issued Even Though Act Discretionary
In June of 1954 the county court of McDowell County determined that, because of its poor financial position, it would be
unable to pay the salary or expenses of a county probation officer
for the ensuing fiscal year. Accordingly, it ordered the judge of
the criminal court of the county not to continue the appointment
of a probation officer for the next fiscal year. The judge, however,
did not revoke his appointment and the probation officer continued to function in that capacity. He sought mandamus in the
supreme court to require the county to pay his salary and expenses. Irrespective of the fact that there was no showing that the
53
For articles
activity, see Jaffe,
70 HIuv. L. Rxv.
69 HAnv. L. Rpv.
69 HAnv. L. Ilxv.

§§835-46 (1956).

concerning the scope of judicial review of administrative
Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact,
953 (1957); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions of Fact,
1020 (1956); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law,
239 (1955). See also Fonxosc , AD msuTATvE LAW

54 See text at notes 149-52, infra.
55 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 49, 50, supra.
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petitioner had been derelict in carrying out his duties, the court
denied his application. It held that county courts are vested with
wide discretion in administering the financial affairs of their counties, and that, when officials have discretionary duties, mandamus
"is never employed to prescribe in what manner they shall act, or
to correct errors they may have made."56
Oft-times relators plead themselves out of court by claiming
that official action is erroneous. In a well-known Illinois case,
People ex rel. Sheppard v. Dental Examiners,5 7 a dental licensing
board was given the authority to admit to practice without an
examination graduates of any "reputable dental college." Sheppard
was refused a license without examination on the ground that his
alma mater was not "reputable." His petition for mandamus was
not granted. Determination as to the character of dental colleges
had been delegated by the legislature to the administrative board.
The court would not transfer to the judicial forum the very issue
for which the agency had been created to resolve. Similarly, in
West Virginia the courts have refused to substitute their judgment
for that of a school board in hiring teachers,5 8 they have not seen
fit to dictate to the state road commission when and where it should
reconstruct, repair, and maintain highways,5 9 and they have not
controlled the way in which the compensation commissioner exercises his discretion in waiting after an injury to determine when
it has reached the stage at which a fair award could be made.00
The legislature meant the manner of exercise of discretion on these
matters to rest in the hands of administrative specialists.61
56 Meador v. County Court, 87 S.E.2d 725, 736 (W. Va. 1955).
For other cases in which courts have been reluctant to dictate the manner
in which administrators exercise their discretionary powers, see Sleeth v. Dairy
Products Co., 228 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1955); State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W. Va. 442, 48 S.E.2d 9 (1948); Wiley v. County Court, 111
W. Va. 646, 163 S.E. 441 (1932); Miller v. County Court, 34 W. Va. 285,

12 S.E. 702 (1890).

m s § § 33, 37.
See also HIGH, op. cit supra note 48, §42; MERnmL, MANDu
57 11011. 180 (1884).
58
Bates v. Board of Education, 133 W. Va. 225, 55 S.E.2d 777 (1949).
59
Reynolds v. State Road Comm'n, 111 W. Va. 398, 162 S.E. 319 (1932).
6o Walden v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 307, 167 S.E. 743
(1933).
6
1 Two well-known cases in which appellate courts in other states refused
to upset rather debatable determinations by agencies are: Scudder v. Board
of Selectmen, 309 Mass. 373, 34 N.E.2d 708 (1941), discussed in J rrx,
LAw 500, and in Brown, The Use of Extraordinary Legal
ADm, usmA _F,
and Equitable Remedies to Review Executive and Administrative Action in
Massachusetts, 21 B.U.L. REv. 632 (1941); and Marburg v. Cole, 286 N.Y.
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A contrast to the cases on reluctance by the courts to use
mandamus to control the way in which administrators use their
discretionary power can be seen in a case involving tolls on bridges
between Wheeling Island and the mainland. 62 The city of Wheeling, after it obtained them, doubled the tolls between the island
and Ohio and eliminated those on the bridges to West Virginia.
The petitioners asked the public service commission to restore the
West Virginia tolls and halve the Ohio ones. It refused to act
because of a pending sale of the bridges from the city to the
state road commission. A writ of mandamus was directed to the
commission either to restore the tolls or to decline to do so. It is
"not the right of such a body to suspend unduly, by awaiting the
alternative occurrence of a future event, the exercise of its proper
function."6 3 While the court did not suggest the course of conduct to be followed by the commission, it did order it to exercise
its discretion. This position is in 'full accord with other cases in
which administrative officials have been commanded by mandamus to exercise their discretionary powers.64
Since it is possible to seek mandamus to compel an official to
use his discretionary authority, could not the courts take the
matter just one step further and assert that in some instances the
purported exercise of discretion was no act at all? Is not abuse of
discretion tantamount to nonexercise of it? In this regard it is
worthwhile to compare another Illinois dental board case with the
Sheppard case. Sheppard had pleaded that the board acted erroneously; the court refused to control the way in which the board
used its discretion. In this other case Cooper, the relator, pleaded
that the board acted fraudulently in classifying the school from
which he graduated as not reputable. His argument was not that
the board had acted in error, but that, because of animosity toward
his alma mater, it had not really exercised any discretion at all. The
appellate court agreed that abuse of discretion was equivalent to
202, 86 N.E.2d 118 (1941), discussed in Fos~oscn, ADIvmNismAarvm LAw
and in Note, 16 ST. JoHN s L. lExv. 145 (1941).
§ 323,
62
Vilage of Bridgeport v. Public Service Comm'n, 125 W. Va. 842,
24 S.E.2d 285 (1948).
63 Id. at 348, 24 S.E.2d at 288.
64
See, e.g., Mustard v. Bluefield, 180 W. Va. 763, 45 S.E.2d 326 (1947);
Wriston v. State Compensation Comm'r, 112 W. Va. 535, 165 S.E. 806 (1932);

Bonner v. State Compensation Commr, 110 W. Va. 38, 156 S.E. 847 (1931);
State ex rel. Miller v. Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362 (1884).
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failure to exercise it, and it indicated that if Cooper could prove
his allegations mandamus would be awarded. 5
The same approach is used by the West Virginia courts to
broaden the availability of mandamus. A court will require an
official to proceed
"... not only when the officer absolutely refuses to act at all,

but also when he has acted, and it appears to the court
that he has not acted in good faith, but has on the contrary,
set up as an excuse and as a cover for his disobedience of
the law, a mere pretense of action. This the law holds
equivalent to no action, no performance of duty ...
[C]ourts will not allow remedies to be defeated by mere
pretexts or evasions of duty."6
Thus, mandamus will be issued by West Virginia judges when the
discretion only purported has been exercised, that is, when the
officials have acted in an "arbitrary," "capricious," or "abusive"
67

fashion.

Emotionally charged words used by pleaders in seeking writs
of mandamus governing official discretionary action cover two
separate types of alleged administrative errors. Some of them relate
to unreasonable determinations by agencies; others deal with determinations which appear wholly reasonable, but which are beyond
the power of the agencies to make-ultra vires actions.
An application for mandamus to require a town council to
issue a pool hall license furnishes an example of the first type of
case.68 The town of Clendenin denied a pool hall license ostensibly
for three reasons. It was unable to prove two of them, and the
third reason was based on fear of what might have happened had
65

Dental Examiners v. People

ex rel. Cooper, 123 III. 227, 13 N.E. 201

(1887).
66

Dillon v. Bare, 60 W. Va. 483, 486, 56 S.E. 390, 391 (1906).
For examples of use of such terms to describe the way in which discretion has been used, see Thacker v. Crow, 90 S.E.2d 199, 203 (W. Va. 1955)
("arbitrary and capricious"); State ex rel. Ward v. Raleigh County Court,
67

138 W. Va. 551, 555, 76 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1953) ("arbitrary, capricious, or
based on a misapprehension of law"); Beverly Grill v. Crow, 183 W. Va. 214,
219, 57 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1949) ("arbitrary and capricious"); State ex rel.
Garbutt v. Charnock, .105 W. Va. 8, 14, 141 S.E. 403, 405 (1928) ("unsoundly
and capriciously exercised"); State ex rel. Hoffman v. Town of Clendenin, 92
W. Va. 618, 621, 115 S.E. 583, 584 (1923) (discretion "must be governed
by rule, it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular");
State ex rel. Noyes v. Lane, 89 W. Va. 744, 748, 110 S.E. 180, 181 (1921)
("arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent," "results from a misapprehension of law").
8
6 State ex rel. Hoffman v. Town of Clendenin, 92 W. Va. 618, 115 S.E.

583 (1923).
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the license been granted. The court granted mandamus because
running a pool hall is a legitimate business which cannot be assumed to be likely to become a nuisance. It is unreasonable to deny
such a license because of such fears. Another illustration of unreasonable official action can be seen in a case in which Beckley officials refused to grant a church a building permit.69 One of the
reasons given for the refusal, that construction of the church would
create a traffic congestion, was spurious. It was not reasonable to
assume that traffic generated by a congregation of only twentyfive or thirty members would do that.70
In many mandamus cases it is none too easy to convince a
court that administrative action was arbitrary. Cooper, the applicant for the dental license, won his case as a matter of law in a
determination based on a demurrer by the respondents. 71 He did
not have to prove his allegations. West Virginia relators faced
with the problem of proving unreasonableness have not always
succeeded. In another pool hall case a former licensee was unable
to convince the court that a county court had denied renewal of his
license because a corporation had pressured the officials.72 The
state auditor, acting as an ex officio insurance commissioner, was
not mandamused to require him to renew an insurance agent's
license; the court was convinced that the auditor had not abused
4
the
his discretion. 78 In Myers v. State Compensation Comnmr%
court held that the evidence was insufficient to show the petitioner had a new condition which would entitle him to have his
case reopened. Therefore, the decision not to open the case again
75
was reasonable.
69 State ex rel. Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va. 368, 154 S.E. 876 (1930).
Although the court spoke neither of discretion nor of arbitrary exercise of it,
this case falls into that pattern. It is instructive to see what the courts do as
well as what they say.
70
See also State ex rel. Garbutt v. Charnock, 105 W. Va. 8, 141 S.E.
408 (1928).

71 Dental Examiners v. People ex rel. Cooper, 128 IM. 227, 12 N.E.

201 (1887).
72
State ex rel. Hamrick v. Pocahontas County Court, 92 W. Va. 222, 114
S.E. 519 (1922).
78 State ex rel. Swearingen v. Bond, 96 W. Va. 193, 122 S.E. 539 (1924).
74 113 W. Va. 316, 167 S.E. 740 (1933).
75
For other cases in which relators were unable to prove abuse of discretion, see Sleeth v. Dairy Products Co., 228 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1955);

Walden v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 307, 167 S.E. 743 (1933);
State ex rel. Dillon v. Neal, 104 W. Va. 259, 139 S.E. 757 (1927).
Compare Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Sawyers, 93 S.E.2d 25 (W. Va.
1956), with Hardy v. Simpson, 118 W. Va. 440, 190 S.E. 680, 191 S.E.
47 (1937).
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Words such as "arbitrary" and "capricious" reflect flavor of ill
motives on the part of officials. Do relators have to prove that
there was a bad motive for administrative action? In Dillon v.
Bare7 6 the state auditor asserted that assessors had acted fraudulently and dishonestly in making assessments which were far below true
value. His only proof, however, was a showing that their valuations were below his and that they refused to follow his suggestions. That did not convince the court that the respondents had
acted in bad faith, and it refused to grant the writ. Action for evil
motives should be subject to control by mandamus on the ground
that it is unreasonable. But failure to prove evil motives should
not in and of itself defeat mandamus. Nor should an affirmative
showing that officials were making a good faith attempt to comply
with the law bar issuance of the writ. 77 Even with the best of
intentions administrators can on some occasions act unreasonably. 78
The second subheading of the "arbitrary use of discretion"
cases concerns actions which, though reasonable, are ultra vires.
The case of Thacker v. Crow70 is illustrative. There the beer commissioner refused to transfer a license to a place located within
three hundred feet of the entrance to a school playground. It was
reasonable to deny a license to a person who would use it to serve
beer close by an area in which young children congregate. But the
statute gave the commissioner no such power. He was required to
deny licenses to sell beer within three hundred feet of the "front
door" of a "school," but "school" cannot be read to include a playground, especially in light of the reference to "front door." The
action was held to be "arbitrary and capricious" because it was
beyond the commissioner's power under the statute. Similarly, a
city council was mandamused to issue a building permit because
it acted on a reasonable, but ultra vires, "long determined policy."80
An election board of canvassers might be acting as reasonable
men would act in altering returns on the theory that fraud bad
been practiced, but one such board was ordered by the supreme
76 60 W. Va. 483 56 S.E. 390 (1906).
77
In State ex rel. West Virginia State Lodge v. Charleston, 133 W. Va.
420, 56 S.E.2d 763 (1949), mandamus was denied because, among other
things, the city was making a good faith effort to conform with the law. It is
submitted that a good faith effort may not always be enough.
78
See, e.g., State ex rel. Hoffman v. Town of Clendenin, 92 W. Va. 618,
115 S.E. 583 (1923).
79 90 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1955).
80 State ex rel. Nunley v. Mayor, 94 W. Va. 189, 117 S.E. 882 (1928).
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court to reconvene and count the excluded ballots; it had no power
to hear and consider evidence of fraud in an election. 81 Inasmuch
as the courts are the final arbiters of statutory interpretations, the
power to prevent officials from self-enlargement of their authority
82
is a broad one.
Assuming that a board has acted beyond its powers, what
should a judge do when he is presented with a petition asking for
mandamus? Should he enter an order compelling a licensing body
to grant a permit? In a leading case the United States Supreme
Court refused to take such drastic action. 83 The Court found that
the F.C.C. had denied a broadcast license on an improper ground.
But, instead of instructing the lower court to mandamus the commission to issue the license, the Supreme Court gave it directions
to dissolve the writ. The whole basis for allowing mandamus in
the ultra vires area is the assumption that the agency has not really
acted but has only purported to do so. Just as in cases where there
has been a failure to act, here the order should be one to take action, proper action on the basis of the correct interpretation of the
agency's powers. Thus, an assessor should be ordered to make a
proper assessment, but should not be coerced to assess at any
given value determined by a court.84 Canvassers should be ordered
to count ballots, but should not be compelled to certify that a certain candidate has won an election. 85 Mandamus will lie to compel
81

State ex rel. Mahan v. Claypool, 97 W. Va. 670, 125 S.E. 810 (1924).
other ultra vires cases from West Virginia, see State ex rel. Ward
v. Raleigh County Court, 138 W. Va. 551, 76 S.E.2d 579 (1953) (county court
no power to fix maximum limit for expense accounts of sheriff and deputies);
Beverly Grill v. Crow, 133 W. Va. 214, 57 S.E.2d 244 (1949) (commissioner
no power to refuse beer license because people in neighborhood object); State
ex rel. Bunch v. Fortney, 93 W. Va. 292, 116 S.E. 758 (1923) (certificate of
public convenience and necessity cannot be refused because nasty letter from
petitioner's attorney convinces commission that issuance would result in continual friction); State ex rel. Noyes v. Lane, 89 W. Va. 744, 110 S.E. 180
(1921) (city clerk gave invalid reasons for rejecting petitions for recall
election).
For leading ultra vires cases from other jurisdictions, see State ex rel.
United District Heating v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 418, 179
N.E. 188 (1931), aff'd on rehearing, 125 Ohio St. 302, 181 N.E. 129 (1932),
discussed in Note, Mandamus in Administrative Proceedings,25 IowA L. REv.
638, 641 (1940); Sausser v. Department of Health, 242 N.Y. 66, 150 N.E.
603 (1926); People ex rel. Sprenger v. Department of Health, 226 N. Y. 209,
123 N.E. 879 (1919).
S3 Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 809
S2 For

U.S. 134 (1940).
84

.85

Dillon v. Bare, 60 W. Va. 483, 485, 56 S.E. 390, 391 (1906) (dictum).
State ex rel. Mahan v. Claypool, 97 W. Va. 670, 125 S.E. 810 (1924).
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a county court to audit and approve proper expense accounts,
but the courts will not direct it as to the dollars and cents which
86
should be approved.
There are cases in which it is clear that the only ground which
is or which might be asserted for a certain exercise of discretion is
ultra vires.8 7 Perhaps in such instances it is not going too far for
a court to order by mandamus a permit to issue, a person to be
restored to a job, or some other specific action. But where an administrator on remand might be able to supply a proper reason
for his action, the courts should remand the matter to the agency.
Nevertheless, West Virginia courts have at times directed administrative bodies and officials to perform certain specific acts;
they have come very close to dictating the manner in which administrators should exercise their discretion.88 This goes beyond
the theory on which courts intervene by mandamus in matters of
administrative discretion. It also tends to transfer to the judicial
forum questions which were intended by the legislature to be settled by administrative agencies.
B.

Writ Denied Even Though Act Ministerial

Perhaps the all time champion litigant (at least as to number of
appearances) before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is the state's long-time auditor, Edgar B. Sims. Although he
has appeared as a relator seeking mandamus,8 9 Mr. Sims has been
much more in evidence as a defendant in mandamus proceedings.
As a respondent he has won cases90 even though most of his duties
are ministerial in nature and, under the usual mandamus formula,
86 State ex rel. Ward v. Raleigh County Court, 188 W. Va. 551, 76 S.E.2d
579 (1953).
87 See, e.g., Thacker v. Crow, 90 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1955).

Beverly

Grill v. Crow, 138 W. Va. 214, 57 S.E.2d 144 (1949); State ex rel. Nunley

v. Mayor, 94 W. Va. 189, 117 S.E. 882 (1928).
88 See, e.g., State ex rel. Bunch v. Fortney, 98 W. Va. 292, 116 S.E.

753 (1923).
89 See, e.g., Sims v. Fisher, 125 W. Va. 512, 25 S.E.2d 216 (1943). This
case and later ones in which the supreme court attempted to circumvent it
without giving the appearance of doing so are discussed in Colson, Servtice of
.Process in a Delinquent Lands Proceeding-A Suit That Is Not a Suit, 54
W. VA. L. REv. 55 (1951); Bailey, Process in Forfeited and Delinquent Lands

Suits-A Moot Question?, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 47 (1951); Bailey, The West
Virginia Law of Forfeited and Delinquent Lands, 50 W. VA. L.Q. 158 (1947).
90 See, e.g., State ex rel. Cox v. Sims, 188 W. Va. 482, 77 S.E.2d 151
(1953); State ex rel. Adkins v. Sims, 180 W. Va. 646, 48 S.E.2d 81 (1947);
State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 180 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
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the writ would issue as a matter of course. Sims has scored his
victories because he has been able to convince the judges that the
statutes directing his action were unconstitutional. In West Virunder a statute
ginia a ministerial officer may withhold action
91
which does not conform to the constitution.
Development of the defense of unconstitutionality in West
Virginia stems primarily from three cases. In State ex rel. Miller v.
Buchanan 2 the governor decided that a tax exemption, held unconstitutional by the courts under the Constitution of 1863, would
also be invalid under the present constitution. Acting under his
instructions, the auditor directed assessors to assess property covered by the exemption. Buchanan refused to do so, claiming that
the statute was constitutional and, hence, the instructions were
illegal. The court refused to accept that defense, saying that "it
is not the right of a subordinate executive or ministerial officer to
arrest the execution of the law as construed by the Governor
."93

Neither would it appear to be the right of such an official

to disobey the mandates of the legislature, claiming their invalidity. When that issue first was presented to the supreme
court it dodged it In Payne v. Staunton94 the question was raised
91

For examples of cases in which mandamus was denied because the

enactments requiring action were unconstitutional, see State ex rel. Dewey
Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 96 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1956), 59 W. VA. L.
REv. 374 (1957); State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court, 138 W. Va. 885,
78 S.E.2d 569 (1953), 56 W. VA. L. REv. 119 (1954); State ex rel. Adkins v.
Sims, 130 W. Va. 646, 43 S.E.2d 81 (1947), 52 W. VA. L.Q. 57 (1949);
Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S.E. 264, 80 S.E. 367 (1912).
For examples of cases in which mandamus was awarded because respondents were unable to prove unconstitutionality, see State ex rel. Shabdue v. Sims,
98 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1957); State ex rel. Board of Governors v. O'Brien,
94 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1956), 59 W. VA. L. REv. 206 (1957); State ex rel.
McMillion v. Stahl, 89 S.E.2d 693 (W. Va. 1955); State ex rel. Board of
Governors v. Sims, 140 W. Va. 64, 82 S.E.2d 321 (1954); State ex rel. West
Virginia Board of Educatiin v. Sims, 139 W. Va. 802, 81 S.E.2d 665 (1954);
State ex tel. West Virginia Comm'n on Interstate Cooperation v. Sims, 135
W. Va. 257, 63 S.E.2d 524 (1951); State ex rel. Catron v. Sims, 133 W. Va.
610, 57 S.E.2d 465 (1950). See also State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 134 W. Va.
278, 58 S.E.2d 766 (1950), reversed sub nom. West Virginia v. Sims, 841
U.S. 22 (1951), discussed in Abel, Ohio Valley Panorama, 54 W. VA. L. REv.
186 (1952).
For other material on the defense of unconstitutionality, see GELLHORN

ANDBYsE, ADmnaiTsATIrE LAw 309; DAvis, ADvmNisTnATrvE LAw § 228;
Rashbaum, Right of Mandamused Official to Raise Issue of Constitutionality,
19 ST. Louis L.
Note, 33 COLUmx.
9224 W. Va.
93Id. at 382.
94 55 W. Va.

11Ev. 840 (1934); Note, 54 HAv. L. Rgv. 117 (1940);
L. REv. 1036 (1933); Note, 42 HARv. L. Rxv. 1071 (1929).
362 (1884).
202,46 S.E. 927 (1904).
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as to whether a clerk of court could refuse to do a ministerial act
on the ground that the statute requiring it did not conform to the
constitution. The court noted that "confusion and disorder might
ensue from the exercise of such power,"95 but it stated that, if it
were necessary to decide the question, it would not compel the
clerk to execute a void act.96. However, the realtors had failed to
prove a part of their case so the court was able to determine the
controversy on a basis other than the right of an official to defend
asserting statutory invalidity.97 But in Woodall v. DarstV8 it was
held specifically that the auditor could raise the question of constitutionality. Since that time there has been no question but that
important ministerial officials could justify on that ground failure
to execute a statute.9 9 Also lesser ministerial officers have been
permitted to do so.' 00
Behind cases permitting ministerial officers to assert the defense of unconstitutionality lies the notion that an unconstitutional
law is not really a law at all, being null and void, and that a court
should not compel an officer to do something which is required
of him only by a void and invalid enactment.' 0 ' The difficulty with
this proposition is that all legislative enactments are the law until a
court decides otherwise. Perhaps there is a feeling by the judges
that, if in a case they decide a statute requiring action is invalid
and then proceed to order an official to take action under it, they
are put in an awkward position. That embarrassment can be avoided
simply by refusing to rule on constitutionality of statutes when
their invalidity is asserted by an officer in a mandamus proceeding. If they refuse to decide that question, the statute presumptively is constitutional and no inconsistency would be shown by
an order to act under it.
In most states an officer with ministerial duties, at least in the
general run of cases, may not plead unconstitutionality when he
95 Id.at 206, 46 S.E. at 929.

96 Id. at 208, 46 S.E. at 930.
97Id at 209, 46 S.E. at 930.
98 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S.E. 264, 80 S.E. 367 (1912).
99
See, e.g., State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 96
S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1956) (secretary of state); State ex Yet. Cox v. Sims,
138 W. Va. 482, 77 S.E.2d 151 (1953) (auditor).
100 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court, 188 W. Va. 885,
78 S.E.2d 569 (1953)

(county court).

101 Cf. Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S.E. 264, 80 S.E. 867
(1912); DAvis, ADWMONSTAIV IAW § 223.
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is a respondent in a mandamus proceeding. 0 2 Sound policy supports that position. Even in Payne v. Staunton it was recognized
that it may be unwise to allow subordinate officials to supersede
legislative will just because in their view the lawmakers exceeded
their authority. 10 3 "The business of government cannot be held in
abeyance because a nonjudicial functionary doubts the validity of
mandates given him by the duly established law-making body."104
In states which do not permit this defense is not an official
put in a dilemma? If he does not act, he will be subject to a mandamus suit against which he cannot defend. If he acts and the
statute is later held unconstitutional, he may be subjected to liability for acting beyond the scope of his constitutional powers.
This is especially true of situations in which action consists in
paying out government funds or in forcing someone to pay taxes.
Because of this difficulty in most jurisdictions a court will consider a plea of invalidity as justification for an official's refusal to
act, in the event his acting under the statute might subject him to
some personal liability, if the law were later held unconstitutional. 10 5 There is, however, no need for such doctrine in West
Virginia. Officials here are not put into the dilemma, but are
free to act. By statute they are protected from all liability, both
civil and criminal, if they take action under a statute or an order
from the governor and later the statute or order is held unconstitutional. 106
There might, however, arise situations when prompt determination of a constitutional question is desirable, and when it does
not appear that someone other than the officer entrusted with carrying out the statute will raise the issue. Suppose, for example,
there is some question as to the validity of a statute providing for
102 See, e.g., State ex rel. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Becker, 328 Mo.
541, 41 S.W.2d 188 (1981); State ex rel. State Bridge Comm'n v. Griffith, 136
Ohio St. 334, 25 N.E.2d 847 (1940). See also GEI.LuomN A m BysE, ADvnmasTRATivE LAw 809; DAvis ADmaNisTATnVz LAw § 223; MMaMML, MANAUs
§ 65. But see State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 180 N.E. 865
(1932); Holman v. Pabst, 27 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Montpelier
v. Gates, 106 Vt. 116, 170 At. 473 (1934).
103 55 W. Va. at 206, 46 S.E. at 929.
104 GmELitOI AmBYSE, ADmrIsmTRATrvE LAw 399.
105 See, e.g., State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 119 Ore. 141, 248 Pac. 358
(1926); Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285 (1909).
106 W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 5, § 18 (Michie 1955).
The protection of this statute is limited to officials; it does not immunize
others from liability for actions taken under a statute later held unconstitutional.
Morton v. Cabot. 134 W. Va. 55, 63 S.E.2d. 861 (19(49).
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the issuance of bonds by a state agency.10 7 Until they are sold it
might be difficult to find proper parties to contest the validity of
the bonds. Even declaratory judgment procedures have their limitations.'0 8 But sale of the bonds will be slow when the investing
public is aware of the constitutional doubts concerning them. The
easiest way to handle the problem would be to have the secretary
of state refuse to seal them. 10 9 Then the agency for which the bonds
were being issued could bring mandamus against the secretary of
state to command him to do his duty. If he could raise the constitutionality of the statute as a defense, the test case would answer
the problem bothering the prospective investors. Recently this
type of proceeding neatly took care of the problem the university
board of governors had in marketing bonds issued to raise money
for construction at West Virginia University."10
If officers are permitted indiscriminately to question constitutionality, even in cases where there is no real need for fast judicial
determination as to the legality of a statute, a confused situation
results. Nonlegal officers will be in a position to arrest the execution of legislative commands. If, on the other hand, officers cannot
raise the issue, many chances for final judicial determinations on
vital issues will be passed by. West Virginia believes the first
evil is preferable. But in some other jurisdictions a third approach
has been adopted. An officer may justify refusal to act when he
has been advised by the state attorney general that the enactment
is invalid."' This is the best solution to the problems here. The
attorney general is a legal officer whose duty it is to advise officials
of the state as to matters of law. 1 2 It is better to have him, instead
of someone unlearned in law, make determinations as to whether
or not the legislature has exceeded its authority. In questionable
107
08

1

Such doubt would be created by W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
In declaratory judgment proceedings, just as in any other type of

litigation, the parties must have a real, live controversy to give them the right

to appear in court seeking relief. See, generally Developments in the Law:
Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HAIv. L. REv. 787, 805-17 (1949);
BoacHARU,

DECLARATORY JuDGmENTs 293-314 (2d ed. 1941).

109 The secretary of state is keeper of the great seal of the state. W. VA.
CONST. art. 2, § 7; W. VA. CODE c. 5, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955).
110 State ex rel. Board of Governors v. O'Brien, 94 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va.
1956).
"'1See, e.g., Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912);
State ex rel. Equality Savings & Bldg. Ass'n v. Brown, 334 Mo. 781, 68 S.W.2d
55 (1934); Department of State Highways v. Baker, 69 N.D. 702 290 N.W.
257 (1940); Commonwealth v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 At. 961 (1904).
112 W. VA. CoDE: c. 5, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1955).
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cases, where a real doubt exists as to the constitutionality, he could
direct the official not to act. Then a mandamus proceeding would
follow in which the issue of constitutionality would be considered
and the law, consequently, would be tested.
III.

CLEAR DuTy

To Acr RuLE

Not everyone who feels an administrative agency has wronged
him, and in so doing has acted contrary to law, is permitted by the
courts to present the substance of his claim before them. Judicial
review, whether by means of mandamus or by some other method,
is reserved for persons who can demonstrate sufficient "interest."
Litigants must have more than a burning curiosity; they must have
what is described as "standing to sue."113 Many persons may feel
some impact from an administrative decision, but, according to the
4
law, only "persons aggrieved" by the action may go to court."
Who is "aggrieved"? The law of standing to sue is not very definite
about that. Obviously the person with the most at stake is the party
to an administrative proceeding against whom a decision has been
rendered. The pool hall operator who cannot get a license,"15 the
"13 Standing is required both of plaintiffs, Tileston v. Ullman, 818 U.S.
44 (1943); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); and of defendants,
Yazoo & M.V.R.R.v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Heskett
v. McRee, 215 Ark. 328,220 S.W.2d 422 (1949).
The course pursued by the courts in matters of standing is, however, not
always easy to follow. Compare Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485
(1952), with Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952); commented upon in Davis, Standing, Ripeness and Civil Liberties: A Critique of
Adler v. Boardof Education,38 A.B.A.L.J. 924 (1952). Compare United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), with Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949); commented upon in 37 A.B.A.L.J. 833 (1951).
For general information concerning standing, see HAPRT AN WECHSLm,
THE FEDERAL CounTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTE= 160-75 (1953); DAVIs,
ADM MOSrA vE LAW §§ 199-209 (1951).
11
4 In West Virginia the requirement of standing to sue rests both on
case law and specific statutory provisions. For cases dealing with standing
of plaintiffs, see State ex rel. West Virginia State Lodge v. Charleston, 133
W. Va. 420, 56 S.E.2d 763 (1949); Crank v. McLaughlin, 125 W. Va. 126, 23
S.E.2d 56 (1942); Payne v. Staunton, 55 W. Va. 202, 46 S.E. 927 (1904).
Concerning the standing of defendants compare State ex rel. Thompson v. Fry,
137 W. Va. 321, 71 S.E.2d 449 (1952), with State ex rel. Huntington v.
Heffley, 127 W. Va. 254, 32 S.E.2d 456 (1944). For statutes in which standing is required as a prerequisite to judicial review of administrative action,
see W. VA. CODE c. 7, art. 5, § 9 (Michie 1955); id. c. 21A, art. 7, §§ 17, 22;
W. VA. CODE c. 33, art. 2, § 11 (Michie Supp. 1957).
For a discussion of the impact of statutory provisions on the law of
standing to sue, see DAvis, ADmnmisTRATIVE LAw § 202.
115 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hoffman v. Town of Clendenin, 92 W. Va.
618, 115 S.E. 583 (1923); State ex rel. Kelley v. Grafton, 87 W. Va. 191,
104 S.E. 487 (1920).
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government employee whose job has been taken from him,110 the
property owner who has been refused a building permit,117 the
creditor of the state who cannot get a warrant signed, 118 and the
injured person whose claim to workmen's compensation has been
denied 1 9 have all had their day in court. In such cases there is
little question; the courts will entertain the petitions for relief if
the parties use the correct procedure to raise their complaints.
It is equally as easy to predict that the bon vivant whose
favorite spot has lost its license to sell beer cannot get judicial
relief. But what about the businessman who discovers that the
licensing authority has permitted someone to compete with him?
Can he go to court? He is being hurt by the official action. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions competitors have been prohibited from
complaining to the courts about administrative largess to their
business rivals. 120 In Crank v. McLaughlin'2 ' the petitioners were
producers and sellers of milk in Charleston. They sought a decree
declaring that the action of the commissioner of agriculture in
abrogating certain Charleston ordinances dealing with the sale of
milk in the city was illegal. The effect of the commissioner's action
was to permit competitors formerly frozen out of the city market
by the ordinance to share in it. This, however, did not prejudice
the dairies enough to permit them to raise the question of the
validity of the administrative action. The court pointed out that
the city could have questioned in the courts the abrogation of its
ordinance and that consumers or consumer groups might have
complained that their health was being affected by opening their
116 See, e.g., Stowers v. Blackburn, 90 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1955); Bates
v. Board of Education, 133 W. Va. 225, 55 S.E.2d 777 (1949).
117 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ammerman v. Philippi, 136 W. Va. 120, 65
S.E.2d 713 (1951); Carter v. Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
18 See, e.g., State ex rel. Shabdue v. Sims, 98 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1957);
State ex rel. Catron v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 610, 57 S.E.2d 465 (1950); Glover
v. Sims, 121 W. Va. 407, 3 S.E.2d 612 (1939).
119 See, e.g., State ex rel. McDonald v. Sharp, 90 S.E.2d 875 (W. Va.
1957); Wriston v. State Compensation Comm'r, 112 W. Va. 535, 165 S.E. 806
(1932).
120 See e.g., Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938);
Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Assn v. Board of License Comm'rs,
171 Md. 426, 189 Ad. 209 (1937). Contra, Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1942); State ex Tel. United
District Heating v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 301, 181 N.E.
129 (1932).
121 125 W. Va. 126,23 S.E.2d 56 (1942).
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sources of supply to new dairies. 122 They were affected sufficiently
to possess standing.
Another type of litigant is the one who sues in a representative
capacity. Parents have standing to dispute actions by school
authorities which injure their offspring. 123 By virtue of statute
voters are entitled to mandamus county courts to divide counties
into precincts as required by law. 124 And, in some instances, West
Virginia taxpayers, unlike those of the United States,'125 have been
allowed to protect inhabitants of the state against the enforcement
of any illegal exactions by officials. 126 Usually a person suing as a
taxpayers' representative also asserts that he has standing as a representative of his fellow citizens and residents. 127 There are instances of statutes authorizing citizens to seek judicial review, 12
and there is case law allowing citizens to sue.129 But even these
representatives must be a part of a group of citizenry that has been
prejudiced. Thus, in a case involving conduct of Charleston authorities, which allegedly violated police civil service law requirements, a citizen and policeman from Huntington was not permitted to sue, but a citizen and policeman from Charleston was
allowed to raise the issue of the propriety of the city's actions. 3 0
Id. at 132, 23 S.E.2d at 59-60.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Nangle v. Board of Education, 81 W. Va. 858,
94 S.E.2 4 500 (1917).
1 W. VA. CODE c. 3, art. 1, § 10 (Michie 1955). But in Payne v.
122

123

Staunton, 55 W. Va. 202, 46 S.E. 627 (1904), voters who were seeking

mandamus to require the clerk of court to permit them to inspect poll books
were denied the writ on the ground that they had no standing. They had no
pecuniary interest to entitle them to standing as individuals. Nor did they have
standing as representatives of the voters, since they were seeking to inspect
the books merely to get evidence on which criminal actions against persons
who allegedly
stuffed the ballot boxes could be based. Id at 209, 46 S.E. at 930.
125 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1928); Elliott v. White, 23
F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
126 See, e.g., Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto, 97 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va.
1957).

127 See, e.g., Cerwig v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 89 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1955);
Prichard v. De Van, 114 W. Va. 509, 172 S.E. 711 (1934); State ex rel.
Matheny v. County Court, 47 W. Va. 672, 35 S.E. 959 (1900).
28 Appeal from an action of the liquor commissioner in granting or
revoking or refusing to grant or revoke a license may be sought by a
"resident of the community in his own behalf or in behalf of the community"
as well as by interested parties. W. VA. CODE c. 60, art. 4, § 21 (Michie

1955).

129

See cases cited in note 127, supra. See also Note, 48 COLum. L. BEv.

124 (1930).

180 State ex rel. West Virginia State Lodge v. Charleston, 138 W. Va.

420, 56 S.E.2d 763 (1949).
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Closely allied to the requirement of standing to sue is the
notion in mandamus cases that petitioners must show a "clear legal
right" to the relief they are seeking.'' l Recently the supreme court
maintained that:
"To warrant this Court in granting this writ, facts must be
presented showing that the relator has a clear legal right
to the performance of the thing demanded...."182
This goes beyond the interest necessary for standing to sue. A successful mandamus relator must show not only that an interest of
his has been prejudiced, but also that the interest amounts to a
"right," and that that right is "clear."
The correlative of a "clear legal right" by the person seeking
review is a "clear legal duty" on the part of the governmental official to perform the act. The Supreme Court of Appeals has noted
that, unless "a corresponding duty rests upon the respondent to
perform the particular acts sought to be required of him by the
relators,"138 it will not issue a mandate to the officer to act. Neither
duty rests intervene as a defendant
can an official upon whom no
34
in a mandamus proceeding.1
What sort of "right" or "duty" is "clear"? If this rule means
that mandamus will not issue until the court decides there is a
legal duty to act, a perfectly obvious proposition, then nothing is
added by describing the duty as "clear." If, on the other hand, it
means that when an applicable rule is disputable or that the administrator's view is "reasonable," and the court will refrain from
making its independent determination of the matter, then it is
131 See, e.g., State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Southern West Virginia
Oil & Gas Corp., 91 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1956); Cochran v. Trussler, 89 S.E.2d
306 (W. Va. 1955); Watkins v. State Compensation Comm'r, 111 W. Va. 126,
161 S.E. 20 (1931); State ex rel. Murasky v. State Compensation Commr,
109 W. Va. 218, 153 S.E. 509 (1930); Sleeth v. Dairy Products, Co., 228
F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
See also 2 SPELLiNG, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1369; HMGH, op. cit. supra
note 48, § 9; MxmunL,, MA , AMs § 56.
132 State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Southern West Virginia Oil
& Gas Corp., 91 S.E.2d 737, 740 (W. Va. 1956).
133 State ex Tel. Revercomb v. O'Brien, 91 S.E.2d 865, 872 (W. Va. 1956).
See also State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Southern West Virginia
Oil & Gas Corp., 91 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1956); State ex rel. Murasky v.
State Compensation Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 218, 158 S.E. 509 (1980); State
ex rel. Miller v. Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362 (1884); HIGH, op. cit. supra note
48, § 9; Mm.nut'L, MAN Amus § 57.
3, State ex rel. Thompson v. Fry, 137 W. Va. 821, 71 S.E.2d 449
(1952); but of. State ex reL Huntington v. Heffley, 127 W. Va. 254, 32
S.E.2d 456 (1944).
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quite another thing. It is indeed an alternative manner of expressing the ministerial-discretionary act rule.13 5 Probably the latter
is intended.
Two further questions might be raised. Why, before declaring
the law, must a judge decide the preliminary question as to whether
the "right" of "duty" he is about to enforce is "clear" or "plain"?
What reasons can be given for failure on the part of the courts to
grant mandamus when there is a showing that the right is indeed
clear and that the duty is quite plain?
A. Why Require "Plain Duty"?
Mandamus originated as an executive tool. It was a mandate
directly from the king, without the intervention of the courts, to a
subject commanding him to perform a particular act. This aspect
of the king's prerogative was later assumed by the court of king's
bench through the convenient fiction that the king sat in that court.
Of course in America mandamus does not issue as a prerogative
writ, but is authorized by constitutional and legislative enactments.
Nevertheless, the writ is an extraordinary remedy in the sense that
it is used only in extraordinary cases and when normal procedures
are ineffectual.' 3 6 This historical background-a background which
does not square very well with the separation of powers theory-in
part explains why before issuing mandamus the West Virginia
courts seek to find the "right" of the petitioner and the "duty" of
the respondent "clear."
Although the Constitution of the United States has no separation of powers provisions, 37 it has been asserted that the branches
of the national government are coordinate and cannot command
each other. A leading judicial proponent of this theory was Chief
Justice Taney.13 In Kendall v. United States,139 although the
501.
For West Virginia cases recounting the origin of mandamus, see
Bailey v. Coleman, 128 W. Va. 510, 514, 16 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1941); Fisher
v. Charleston, 17 W. Va. 595, 603 (1881).
For treatise material on the history of the writ, see 2 BALEsY, HABEAs
CoRPus AND SPECIAL Rmazns §§ 197, 198 (1913); 2 SPELLiNG, op. cit. supra
note 2, §§1362, 1865; Hnir, op. cit. supra note 48 §§ 3-8; MEmuLr,
MANDmrS §§ 1-9; MOSES, MANDAMUS 16-18.
137 Nevertheless, there have been federal cases in which separation of
powers has played a controlling role. See, e.g., A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
135
136 JAF7E, Aumn1.rsT.ATrvE LAw

293 U.S. 388 (1935).

138 The chief architect of judicial supremacy in the United States was

John Marshall. It is instructive to compare hii views in the mandamus part
of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803), with Taney's.
139 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
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Taney court ordered the postmaster general to perform a ministerial

act, it spoke at length about the separation of powers. Taney himself felt that the District of Columbia courts could not issue man-

damus because they were without the royal prerogative. 140 Subsequently, in Decatur v. Paulding,1' 1 writing for the court, Taney
noted that the secretary of the navy was competent to refuse a
pension to a navy widow because his power included "judgment
and discretion" in expounding the laws. He argued that the secretary's construction of the law would not bind judges in a case in
which they had jurisdiction, and neither should that official be
42
bound by the Court's view in a matter within his jurisdiction.
The West Virginia Constitution prohibits any government

department from exercising power belonging to either of the
others. 143 The supreme court traditionally has been very emphatic
in its statements that the "departments of government must be kept
separate and distinct, and each in its legitimate sphere must be
protecf d." 144 Especially in two types of cases has this feeling been
manifested: first, cases in which the court has felt that nonjudicial

functions were being given to the judiciary; 145 and, second, cases
in which the court has noted that appeal of judicial questions
140 Id. at 626.
14139 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).

of Taney's constitutional views, see FnANKnm am,
46-73 (1937).
143 W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
144 State ex rel. Miller v. Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362, 379 (1884). See
also Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612, 661 (1875).
145 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court, 188 W. Va. 885,
78 S.E.2d 569 (1953), 56 W. VA. REv. 119 (1954); State v. Huber, 129
W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946); Sims v. Fisher, 125 W. Va. 412, 25 S.E.2d
216 (1943); Staud v. Sill, 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S.E. 428 (1933); Danielley
v. Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S.E. 620 (1933); Rogers v. State Compensation Comm'r, 140 W. Va. 376, 385, 84 S.E.2d 218, 223 (1954), 57 W. VA.
L. REv. 202 (1955) (dissent).
In Hodges v. Public Service Comm'n, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E.
834 (1931), a statute giving a circuit court power to try de novo appeals
from the public service commission under the "Water Power Act," W. Va. Acts
1929, c. 58, was held unconstitutional as an attempt to grant legislative powers
to the judiciary. The case was the subject of a hot round of discussion. Davis,
JudicialReview of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A Study of Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270, 352 (1938); Donley, The Hodges Case
and Beyond-A Reply to Professor Davis, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 291 (1989). In
fulfillment of Professor Donley's prophecy that "practically nobody-least of
all the supreme court-will be influenced by what either of us has written," id.
at 315, the court has noted these "valuable discussions" but has stuck to its
142 For a discussion
THE CONMaECE CLAuSE
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determined by administrative agencies must be available lest they
exercise functions belonging to the courts. 140 Reliance on the first

type of cases would lead to judicial caution in issuing mandamus,
but the existence of the second type indicates that the judges have
not let separation of powers theories stop them from issuing mandamus to administrative officials. Still it is an interesting paradox
to see a court which has "definitely 'settled on a policy of strong
adherence to the several constitutional provisions relating to the
separation of powers"1 47 commanding the other branches of the
state government with such frequency.
A second reason for the "clear duty" rule lies in the idea that
an administrator ought to be left fairly free to determine his own
scope of action. Perhaps the furthest federal judges have gone along
this line was in the Rives case.1 48 A congressional enactment provided that the secretary of interior should grant relief to World
War I manganese speculators for their expenditures "for or upon
property." The secretary limited payments to expenses incurred for
construction, equipment and machinery; Rives insisted the statute
also covered money spent for real estate and mining rights. The Supreme Court refused to upset the secretary's interpretation of the act,
leaving it within his power to determine the area of his discretion.
There are some echoes of the Rives doctrine in West Virginia
law-especially when the court agrees with the administrative
guns. State ex tel. Richardson v. County Court, 188 W. Va. 885, 897, 78
S.E.2d 569, 577 (1958).
In Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto, 97 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1957), the
supreme court avoided holding unconstitutional a statute which provided for
circuit court power to determine "anew all questions submitted to it on appeal"
by so interpreting it as to permit the lower court to consider only judicial
questions.
1468See, e.g., Wilson v. Hix, 186 W. Va. 59, 65 S.E.2d 717 (1951);
De Constantin v. Public Service Comm'n, 75 W. Va. 32, 88 S.E. 88 (1914).
In reviewing findings of fact by administrative agencies courts may not
disturb them when they are supported by substantial evidence for doing so
would violate the separation of powers article of the constitution. Chesapeake
& O.R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 139 W. Va. 161, 170-71, 81 S.E.2d 700,
706 (1953), 57 W. VA. L. RE:. 117 (1955) (dictum). But that rule "has no
application in a case where the finding has no material relation to the issue
of fact determinative of the question involved." Ibid.
147 State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court, 138 W. Va. 885, 897, 78
S.E.2d 569, 577 (1953), quoting from Sims v. Fisher, 125 W. Va. 512, 524, 25
S.E.2d 216,222 (1943).
14 Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925). For a
discussion of this case, see Cousens, Legal Doubt or Determination as a Ground
for Refusing Mandamus, 24 G-o. L.J. 269 (1936).
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determination. 149 But this proposition cannot be carried too far.
Courts will not refrain from granting mandamus in all cases where
there is some difficulty in interpretation of a statute. 150 They might
feel the administrator's interpretation is wrong. Thus, in the
Schroath case, 151 the motor vehicles commissioner was mandamused
to compel issuance of class "A" registration for automobiles vhich
had been leased by the relator to a bank. Although he thought the
statute entitled him to demand the more expensive class "U" registration (common carrier), the court maintained that in order to
hold the statute constitutional it would have to be construed otherwise. The administrator was, as a consequence, not permitted to
draw his own area of authority in requiring class "U" permits.
There are also other cases showing the same approach by our
courts. 152 Discretion as to matters of law is something over which
the judiciary retains the last word.
Perhaps one reason why there are Rives cases on the books is
the nature of the subject matter with which they deal. Rives sought
a gratuity; he had no "right" to government reimbursement when
the end of hostilities undercut the metals market and left him holding the bag. It is noteworthy that many mandamus relators
seek government issuance of so-called "privileges." Although the
privilege-right distinction is an unfortunate hangover from a more
conceptualistic age, it certainly has influenced the law of man149 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, 136 W. Va. 80, 65 S.E.2d 649
(1951); Wells v. State Road Comm'r, 114 W. Va. 709, 173 S.E. 576 (1934).
In Sleeth v. Dairy Products Co., 228 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1955),
the court said:
"It is manifest that the duty imposed upon the county Health Officer b
the statutory regulations involves the construction and application thereof,
and the exercise of judgment and discretion in their enforcement. His
duties are not so plainly marked as to amount to a positive command, and
hence the well established rule applies that the courts will not issue a
mandamus . . . unless the attempted preformance of the duty amounts
to an abuse of discretion."
150 Compare Contonifico Bustese, S. A. v. Morgenthau, 121 F.2d 884
(D. C. Cir. 1942), with Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175
(1925).
'5183 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1954), 57 W. VA. L. REv. 96 (1955).
152 See, e.g., Sudduth v. Snyder, 120 W. Va. 746, 200 S.E. 55 (1938);
Bonner v. State Compensation Comm'r, 110 W. Va. 38, 156 S.E. 847 (1931);
State ex rel. Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va. 368, 154 S.E. 876 (1930).
The supreme court has in mandamus cases also reviewed and upset
administrative findings of the former court of claims, an administrative agency,
which had been accepted by the legislature. See, e.g., State ex rel. Adklns
v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 646, 43 S.E.2d 81 (1947); State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims,
130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947). This practice is discussed in Note,
52 W. VA. L. REv. 57 (1949).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss1/2

30

Davis: Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in West Virginia
MANDAMUS AS REVIEW METHOD
damus. This is especially true in relation to the more shady occupations. Thus, racing horses has been said not to be a matter of right,
but a matter of privilege. 153 If it is a bare privilege, it is easy to
see why courts would insist on a "clear" showing of duty before
ordering the license to issue. The privilege doctrine is by no means
limited to marginally acceptable occupations, but pervades the
whole field of licensing, 154 as well as other areas of administrative
law. 55 While most cases in West Virginia using such language are

older,L 6 their spirit has not yet disappeared.157 Continued judipial
reorientation would be helpful here.
B. Equitable Discretion
Although mandamus originated as a judicial writ in a common
law court and often is referred to as a remedy at law,15s it has
equitable overtones.159 They probably result from the fact that it is
153 State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 133 W. Va. 179,
198, 55 S.E.2d 262, 270 (1949).
154 See, e.g., Nulter v. State Road Comm'r, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E.
549, 194 S.E. 270 (1937); Quesenberry v. State Road Comm'n, 103 W. Va.
714, 138 S.E. 362 (1927); State ex rel. Ellis v. State Road Comm'n, 100
W. Va. 531, 131 S.E. 7 (1925).
For information concerning professional licensing in West Virginia, see
D.LANcy, THE LicENSnGr OF PROFESSIONALS IN WEST VIRGINIA (1938).
See also GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GovRNaVENTAL RESTRAINTS
105-51 (1956); GnCHoRN Am BYsE, AD MIuAsTRIE LAw 768-79.
155 Besides in licensing, the privilege doctrine arises in connection with
government employment, use of the mails, applications for a passport, pensions,
and many other areas of the law.
156 See, e.g., Quesenberry v. State Road Comm'n, 103 W. Va. 714, 188
S.E. 362 (1927); State ex rel. Ellis v. State Road Commn, 100 W. Va. 531,
131 S.E. 7 (1925).
1 57
See, e.g., State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 183
W. Va. 179, 55 S.E.2d 262 (1949); Nulter v. State Road Comm'n, 119 W. Va.
312, 198 S.E. 549, 194 S.E. 270 (1937); cf. Green v. Board of Education, 133
W. Va. 356, 364, 56 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1949).
158 See, e.g., Gardner v. Bailey, 128 W. Va. 331, 336, 36 S.E.2d 215,
218 (1945); Fisher v. Charleston, 17 W. Va. 595, 604 (1881).
159 One example of an equitable flavor to mandamus is its use of the
defense of laches. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Policemens Pension or
Relief Fund v. Huntington, 96 S.E.2d 225, 243-44 (W. Va. 1956); Hertzog
v. Fox, 98 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1946); State ex rel Daugherty v. County Court,
127 W. Va. 35, 31 S.E.2d 321 (1944); Cunningham v. Huntington, 97 W. Va.
672, 678, 125 S.E. 810, 812-13 (1924); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Board of Education, 95 W. Va. 57, 120 S.E. 183 (1923).
For a general discussion concerning laches, see Plattenburg, The Defense
of Laches and a Correlative, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 266 (1957).
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an extraordinary remedy.160 They also account for the fact that
sometimes, even when the relator can demonstrate a clear right
and duty, the courts refuse to award mandamus.
The chief contribution of equity to the law of mandamus is
the doctrine of "equitable discretion." Its best known expression
was in United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern.10' There Justice
Stone announced that:
"[M] andamus... may be refused for reasons comparable
to those which would lead a court of equity, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
1 62 to withhold its protection of an
undoubted legel right."
If issuance of the writ will "work a public injury or embarrassment,"163 it is within the discretion of a judge to deny it. Injection
of this doctrine into the field of mandamus creates uncertainty and
poses a difficulty for the judges when they are faced with situations
in which hardship will result no matter what they decide. Nevertheless, the rule of the Greathousecase is the law of West Virginia. 04
When is the cure of mandamus worse than the disease of no
adequate judicial remedy? The most frequent instances arise when
grant of mandamus would not really help the petitioner. For
example, in moot cases, even though the relator has a right to
mandamus, issuance of the writ would be of no avail. 16 Short of a
moot case, there are other situations in which the writ would be
idle. Thus, mandamus will not be awarded to require a city to
institute condemnation proceedings when such proceedings, if inmA-US
§ 62.
For cases referring to mandamus as an extraordinary remedy, see Gardner
v. Bailey, 128 W. Va. 331, 336, 36 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1945); Bailey v. Coleman,
123 W. Va. 510, 515, 16 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1941).
161289 U.S. 352 (1938).
162 Id. at 359.
163 Id. at 360.
16 4 For cases expressing the view that issuance of mandamus is discretionary with a judge, see State ex rel. Pardue v. County Court, 105 W. Va.
235, 239, 141 S.E. 874, 875-76 (1928); State ex rel. Miller v. Buchanan, 24
160 Cf. MEBmLL, MA.

W. Va. 362, 384 (1884)

(dictum).

In State ex rel. Trust Co. v. Melton, 62 W. Va. 253, 264, 57 S.E. 729,
733 (1907), the court stated that:
"There may be discretion in the courts to refuse the writ of mandamus,
under peculiar circumstances, rendering inefficacus beyond the vindication of a dry or fruitless legal right, or where the conduct of the applicant,
in the nature of a waiver or estoppel, makes it inequitable or unjust, on
his part to exact strict and full compliance with the law ...
165 See, e.g., Gerwig v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 89 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va.
1955); State ex rel. Clayton v. Neal, 122 W. Va. 501, 11 S.E.2d 109 (1940).
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stituted, would not result in any recovery for the petitioner. 166 Also,
in its discretion the court refused to mandamus the road commission to turn over to a receiver monies which it owed a contractor
167
against whom a general creditors' proceeding had been instituted.
The commissioner had agreed to turn over the fund to proper
parties after a court order of distribution was made. The funds
were safe in administrative hands; there was nothing to be gained
from turning them over to the receiver. Mandamus is not available
to protect a mere abstract right. Under such circumstances the
judges will exercise their discretion to refuse the writ.6 8
There might be times when mandamus would be very beneficial to the party seeking it, but would cause a public injury outweighing the private good. In the Greathouse case the relators
proved their right to a permit for construction of a wharf, but the
court in its discretion refused the writ noting that its grant would
be prejudicial to the public interest because it would have been
necessary to condemn any wharf constructed; the government was
planning a parkway in the area. 16 9 A New York court denied mandamus for a policeman who, during the Second World War, had
been refused the right to retire on a pension. It noted the drastic
wartime depletion of the police ranks and determined that man170
damus to cut the force further would work a public mischief.
This principle has been accepted by the Supreme Court of Appeals
which has declared:
"The writ will not issue if the court can see that it will
operate to the detriment rather than the benefit of the
general public, or cause great disorder and confusion in the
fiscal affairs and duties of the officers of a public corporation."17l
166 State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar, 95 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1957).
167 State ex rel. First Huntington Natl Bank v. State Road Comm'n,
112 W. Va. 341, 164 S.E. 289 (1932).
16S For other cases concerning abstract rights, see State ex rel. Pardue
v. County Court, 105 W. Va. 235, 141 S.E. 874 (1928); Hall v. Staunton, 55
W. Va. 684, 47 S.E. 265 (1904).
169 United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
170 Wolf v. Valentine, 178 Misc. 208, 84 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1942).
171 State ex rel. Pardue v. County Court, 105 W. Va. 235, 875, 141 S.E.
874, 875-76 (1928).
But see State ex rel. Trust Co. v. Melton, 62 W. Va. 253, 264, 57 S.E. 729,
738 (1907), in which the writ was awarded in spite of a recognition that
in proper cases equitable discretion would be exercised to deny mandamus.
The court noted that in that particular case "any embarrassment or hardship
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Consequently, mandamus was refused when it was sought to require construction of a courthouse. 172 There was a dispute going
on as to moving the county seat. Had the courthouse been built
and the county seat moved, an unnecessary drain would have been
made on the county funds.
Executive officials have a broad range of authority in relation
to the policies of government operation. As a matter of discretion
courts will not use mandamus to run the government. For example,
in Hall v. Staunton173 the courts refused to award the writ because
it appeared that th6 relator sought it in order to ferret out a crime.
That is up to public officials. In government operations the balance of interests favors withholding a court mandate. In the first
place, persons other than the relator and the respondent might be
involved. Thus, the alleged wrongdoer against whom the relator
wants the officials to take action would not be in court in a mandamus proceeding. Yet the merits of what he has done would almost inevitably be discussed in a mandamus proceeding. Also here
is a place where political remedies can be effective. If an official
is incompetent, the solution is to fire him and hire a skilled replacement. Another compelling reason for judicial care exists because
of the way in which mandamus is enforced. Disobedience of a
writ is contempt. 174 Would not a court appear ridiculous if it jailed
the city fathers?
It smacks of a judicial power play when cities and counties are
ordered by mandamus to lay certain taxes. Here is an area in
which the judges might well exercise a great deal of caution.
Nevertheless, the supreme court has commanded a city council to
reconvene and make certain tax levies so funds would be on hand
to keep up pension funds. 175 The legislature has sought to regulate
that may ensue must be laid at the feat of ... some persons or body other
than the applicant..."
Of course mandamus wl not be issued to command performance of an
illegal act. State ex rel. Pardue v. County Court, 105 W. Va. 235, 141 S.E.
874 (1928).
172 State ex tel. Matheny v. County Court, 47, W. Va. 672, 85 S.E. 959
(1900).
173 55 W. Va. 684, 47 S.E. 265 (1904). See also Walsh v. LaGuardia,
269 N.Y. 487, 199 N.E. 652 (1936).
174W.VA. CODE c. 53, art. 1, § 11 (Michie 1955); Eureka Pipe Line Co.
v. Riggs, 75 W. Va. 853, 83 S.E. 1020 (1914).
175 Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund v. Huntington,
96 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1956).
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the power of the judiciary in regard to one aspect of mandamus
to require levying a tax. It has provided that:
"Whenever a writ of mandamus, issued to enforce the laying of a levy to satisfy a judgment against a political subdivision of the State would produce a disturbance in the
administration of the financial affairs of the political subdivision not necessary to the protection and enforcement
of the right of the creditor, the court may order that the
levy be distributed equally over a period of years not to
exceed ten ... :176

Further legislation in this direction would be desirable.
Because of its nature the judicial process does not lend itself
well to handling certain situations. In such cases judges often
exercise their discretion not to command. Courts, especially courts
of law, give specific dollars and cents, or guilty or not guilty judgments. As a consequence, mandamus is not often granted when it
would take a long period of time and a lot of acts to comply with
the mandate. Courts will stay clear of supervision. Then too the
judicial system is designed to answer questions either yes or no.
Some mandamus petitions ask more than that of a judge. In one
California case a disappointed civil service examinee sought to have
his comparative ranking altered. 177 The question was not whether
he was or was not eligible,'178 a question judges will handle, but
he was more or less eligible than a lot of other people. Where a
comparison is sought, rather than a single dispositive determination,
the courts in their equitable discretion will not grant the remedy.
CONCLUSION
Examination of recent reports of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reveals a comparative abundance of mandamus cases. Three factors contribute to this: (1) original, as
well as appellate, jurisdiction in the supreme court; 179 (2) dearth
of specific statutory methods of review of administrative actions;
and (3) ease in obtaining mandamus because of the liberality with
which the courts in West Virginia issue it.
176W. VA. CODE C. 53, art. 1, § 12 (Michie 1955). Applied in Wheeling
v. John F. Casey Co., 89 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1937).

177 Mitchell v. McKevitt, 128 Cal. App. 458, 17 P.2d 789 (1982).
178 The simple yes or no sort of question is involved in most occupational
licensing.
179 In Arkansas, where there is very limited original jurisdiction in the
state supreme court to issue mandamus, there has been only a handful of
cases in the reports in recent years.
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Extension of specific statutory review provisions to all administrative agencies and to all executive actions not only would
eliminate the need for mandamus, but also would facilitate judicial
review of agency action.180 Perhaps, it is over ambitious to attempt this, but at least when any new administrative statute is
passed it should provide specific review procedures tailored to the
problems involved. Another, but less likely, method to eliminate
the complexities of mandamus and of the other extraordinary
remedies would be passage of a law designed to afford a single
method of review for all administrative determinations.' 8 '
However, until legislative changes are made, the best method
of improving judicial review by mandamus is through recognition
by the courts that the old formulas are in fact no longer used,
even though in some instances lip service might still be paid to
them. In particular, it would be healthy for the courts to take four
actions. (1) Expressly junk the ministerial-discretionary act distinction. Mandamus is now being issued to compel both ministerial
and discretionary officers, who act beyond authority or unreasonably, to keep within the bounds of propriety. Frank recognition of this would clear away nineteenth century debris still cluttering the cases. (2) Limit determination of constitutionality of a
statute to instances in which administrative refusal to act is based
on advice of the attorney general that the law providing for action
is unconstitutional. This will cut the number of cases brought to
the supreme court in which lay officials refuse to act because of
their own peculiar notions as to constitutional law. (8) Cease
using the "trite"8 2 "clear right" and "plain duty" talk. It adds
nothing to what the courts have in fact done. (4) Recognize that
equitable discretion will permit judges to deny the writ when on
the balance its issuance is contrary to the common good.

18 0 The proposed new rules of civil procedure do not apply to the
extraordinary remedies. Rule 81 (a) (4). The comment notes that this is
"for the time being."
181 New York adopted a single remedy in place of certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition. This unfortunately, did not work out too well. The technical
distinctions still remain. DAvis, ADmIISTMATIVE LAW § 223.
182 The description "trite" is that of the court. Morton v. Sims, 114
W. Va. 434, 438, 172 S.E. 531, 583 (1938).
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